You Can’t Be Sure What You Think

For the sake of discussion, I am simply going to assume these consequences of Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory as discussed at Aeon—

The ISA theory has some startling consequences.

One is that (with limited exceptions), we do not have conscious thoughts or make conscious decisions. For, if we did, we would be aware of them directly, not through interpretation. The conscious events we undergo are all sensory states of some kind, and what we take to be conscious thoughts and decisions are really sensory images – in particular, episodes of inner speech. These images might express thoughts, but they need to be interpreted.

I will explain ISA theory in a future post. That theory is entirely compatible with my Flatland model.

If the Flatland model (including some form of ISA theory) is correct, human are subject everywhere and all of the time to implicit bias—

Also known as implicit social cognition, implicit bias refers to the attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner.

These biases, which encompass both favorable and unfavorable assessments, are activated involuntarily and without an individual’s awareness or intentional control.  Residing deep in the subconscious, these biases are different from known biases that individuals may choose to conceal for the purposes of social and/or political correctness.  Rather, implicit biases are not accessible through introspection.

Here is a key characteristic of implicit bias.

The implicit [unconscious] associations we hold do not necessarily align with our declared beliefs or even reflect stances we would explicitly endorse.

[My note: the source above also asserts that implicit bias is malleable, i.e., such bias can be "gradually unlearned through a variety of debiasing techniques." In the Flatland model, fundamental biases (defenses, instincts, etc.) are not malleable. I don't want to argue about that today.]

So, you can understand confirmation bias or optimism bias (etc.) as fixed (non-malleable) implicit biases. There is an important consequence of the fact that implicit biases do not align with declared beliefs.

If you want to know what people believe, don't ask them. In short, pay attention to what people do, not what they say they believe.

Implicit bias is usually associated (in research) with racial bias. Thus the Aeon article cited at outset goes through this exercise.

Do you think racial stereotypes are false? Are you sure? I’m not asking if you’re sure whether or not the stereotypes are false, but if you’re sure whether or not you think that they are. That might seem like a strange question.

We all know what we think, don’t we?

But of course the whole point is that we don't know what we think.

...Another consequence [of ISA theory] is that we might be sincerely mistaken about our own beliefs.

Return to my question about racial stereotypes. I guess you said you think they are false. But if the ISA theory is correct, you can’t be sure you think that.

Studies show that people who sincerely say that racial stereotypes are false often continue to behave as if they are true when not paying attention to what they are doing.

Such behavior is usually said to manifest an implicit bias, which conflicts with the person’s explicit beliefs. But the ISA theory offers a simpler explanation. People think that the stereotypes are true but also that it is not acceptable to admit this and therefore say they are false. Moreover, they say this to themselves too, in inner speech, and mistakenly interpret themselves as believing it.

They are hypocrites but not conscious hypocrites. Maybe we all are.

Maybe we're all unconscious hypocrites. In fact, that is part of the Flatland claim. The Flatland model also says that "implicit bias" is far more general than simple racial bias. We can't be sure what we think because those biases exist in the unconscious, which by definition is inaccessible to us.

Now, consider an essay which just appeared in The Guardian called—and I'm not kidding—Why elections are bad for democracy. The author is named David VanReybrouck.

Brexit is a turning point in the history of western democracy. Never before has such a drastic decision been taken through so primitive a procedure — a one-round referendum based on a simple majority.

Never before has the fate of a country—of an entire continent, in fact—been changed by the single swing of such a blunt axe, wielded by disenchanted and poorly informed citizens.

I'm here to tell you that there is nothing more democratic than a simple up/down referendum where each vote counts equally. Nothing. That's as democratic as things get.

And yet, VanReybrouck, having just explicitly (but unknowingly) rejected democracy, is concerned about the "health" of democracy.

But this is just the latest in a series of worrying blows to the health of democracy. On the surface, everything still seems fine. A few years ago, the World Values Survey, a large-scale international research project, asked more than 73,000 people in 57 countries if they believed democracy was a good way to govern a country — and nearly 92% said yes.

The World Values researchers asked people what they believe. Big mistake.

But that same survey found that in the past 10 years, around the world, there has been a considerable increase in calls for a strong leader “who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” —and that trust in governments and political parties has reached a historical low. It would appear that people like the idea of democracy but loathe the reality.

Trust in the institutions of democracy is also visibly declining. In the past five years, the European Union’s official research bureau found that less than 30% of Europeans had faith in their national parliaments and governments – some of the lowest figures in years.

[That's] an indication that almost three-quarters of people distrust their countries’ most important political institutions.

Unfortunately, all we've got is surveys here. You know, asking people what they think. But I think we can figure out broadly what's going on. 

If you ask them, 92% of people believe that democracy is a good way to govern a country. But the "reality" is that there has been a considerable increase in calls for "a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliaments or elections."

Well! How can we explain this clear contradiction?

Look at the graphic (from the EU lack of faith Guardian article cited by VanReybrouck ).

There is a considerable difference between asking people (1) as opposed to (2).

(1) Do you believe democracy is a good form of government?

(2) Do you trust the EU as an institution?

The first question solicits a belief, but people can't be sure what they really believe. The second question solicits an inner emotional state, a feeling (trust, safety). These are not the same thing. Under ISA theory, people do have direct access to internal sensory states (e.g., you know you are scared, you know you are in pain, you know you are unhappy.) So we can trust answers to question (2) far more than we can trust answers to question (1).

I would claim that we're looking at implicit bias reflecting the fact that humans strongly incline toward social stratification (hierarchy) in large, complex societies. I talked about that unconscious desire in yesterday's post.

Outside the ruling elites, humans want somebody to take care of them. Dissatisfied Europeans don't have a democratic EU now and never will, of course, so there is merely a strong desire to throw out the current "bad" ruling elites and replace them with another group which will take better care of them. (Ruling elites aren't looking for someone to "take care of them" in the sense intended; in another sense, they "take care" of themselves.)

There's a lot more I can say about all this and I will. This post serves as a brief introduction to that discussion. As usual, follow the links to learn more.

Comments

[colinc]

Wonderful post, Dave! :) This information also completely destroys any and all notions of objectivity AND confirms how most (all?) people conflate "believing" for "thinking," which are, of course, two entirely different processes, yet the latter will invariably be influenced by subjectivity, aka "implicit biases." This, and your planned subsequent articles, should(?) inspire some interesting discussion. Already I'm on pins and needles anticipating the next installment! Well done, sir!