In an article called The Time Bernanke Got It Wrong, Floyd Norris of the New York Times gives us a wonderful quote about rational economic man, also know as Homo economicus.
In his speech last week, Mr. Bernanke cited several assessments of the
Great Moderation, including the one by the Fed economists. None
questioned that it was wonderful.
The Fed chairman conceded that “one cannot look back at the Great
Moderation today without asking whether the sustained economic stability
of the period [1983-2007] somehow promoted the excessive risk-taking that followed.
The idea that this long period of calm lulled investors, financial
firms and financial regulators into paying insufficient attention to
building risks must have some truth in it.”
One economist who would have expected that development was Hyman Minsky [image above]. In 1995, the year before Minsky died, Steve Keen, an Australian
economist, used his ideas to set forth a possibility that now seems
prescient. It was published in The Journal of Post Keynesian Economics...
When I talked to Mr. Keen this week, he called my attention to the fact
that Mr. Bernanke, in his 2000 book “Essays on the Great Depression,”
briefly mentioned, and dismissed, both Minsky and Charles Kindleberger,
author of the classic “Manias, Panics and Crashes.”
They had, Mr. Bernanke wrote, “argued for the inherent instability of
the financial system but in doing so have had to depart from the
assumption of rational economic behavior.”
In a footnote, he added, “I
do not deny the possible importance of irrationality in economic life;
however it seems that the best research strategy is to push the
rationality postulate as far as it will go.”
Before I push the "rational postulate" as far it will go in the Real World, note that "the Great Moderation" properly includes (on the lower end) what I call The Bubble Era (1995-???, and see here and here). Also note that "the Great Moderation" also defines the period (up to 2007) when almost all income gains went to the wealthiest Americans, and household debt grew and grew to make up for lost income.
Now, back to the "rational postulate" and two brief case studies. These examples embrace wildly different areas of our economic life.
Case Study 1 — Student Loan Rates
I'll quote from Cheaper student loans after Senate deal, for now (CNN Money, July 19, 2013).
According to the deal, undergraduates taking out loans this fall will
pay just 3.86% in interest on new loans for this school year — cheaper
than the 6.8% interest rate that kicked in on July 1. The new rates
would apply for loans taken out after July 1.
But student advocates don't like the deal, because rates are expected to rise in coming years.
"It's a missed opportunity, because this is going to cost students more
than leaving current rates in place," said Lauren Asher, president of
the Institute for College Access & Success, a nonprofit that
advocates for more affordable higher education.
Under the deal, a high school senior who takes out college loans in 2017
would see interest rates as high as 7%, higher than current law. And by
2015, graduate students would pay more in interest than is set by
current law...
For loans this fall, undergraduate students would pay an overall
interest rate of 3.86%, comprised of the June 1 yield on the 10-year
Treasury note plus 2.05% extra. Graduate students will have to pay 5.41%
on loans this fall, which is 3.6% over Treasury notes auctioned on June
1.
Every year that the economy improves and interest rates
rise, the Treasury notes will rise. And so would student loan rates
under the new deal. However, loans for undergraduates will be capped at
8.25% and for graduates at 9.5%.
If student loan rates climb into the expected range by 2017, which is likely if the Fed raises short-term rates and stops buying T-bills, it's fair to say that we're getting into some serious usury on the part of the federal government. Why is that happening?
Over 10 years, the bill will
raise $715 million that will go toward reducing deficits, all from
students paying higher interest rates than current law allows.
Thus the federal government, in small part, will attempt to fix its own recklessness on the backs of students paying exorbitant (and growing) tuition costs, as opposed, say, to raising corporate tax rates to reasonable levels. In so far as $715 million is not even a drop in the federal debt bucket, why bother to force former students to pay that money? And where does all the other revenue from student loan interest go? It's certainly not all going to pay the administrative costs of federal loan programs.
It is bad enough that economic policy itself is irrational and unfair. For example, household debt levels are not considered to have an important impact on long-term growth, and nobody seemed to think America's growing income inequality was worth talking about until Occupy Wall Street brought the subject to the public's attention. (That's all over now.)
What is worse is that economic policy is not defined by economists, as bad as that would be. Economic theories are merely props for politicians who can pick and choose among such theories to rationalize and justify whatever agenda they want to carry out. In so far as that agenda often ignores the needs of nearly all of the nation's citizens and puts the desires of the monied elites front and center, can we really speak of a "rational postulate" when discussing our economic life?
How rational is it to condemn many of the nation's young people to a life of student debt slavery? Saddling young people with huge amounts of debt will certainly not further the stated goal, which is fostering economic growth. Even Henry Ford understood that he had to pay his workers a living wage if they were going to be able to buy the Model Ts they were building.
At a higher level of inquiry, given the unfairness on display here, we might ask why do complex human societies exist? Why do nominally capitalistic economies exist? Who enjoys the immense benefits of human societies and "free enterprise" economies, not in theory but in practice? These are the questions that come to mind.
Do you see anything rational, not to mention Good, in usurious student loan rates? Anything at all?
Case Study 2 — Managing Fisheries
Let us skip questions regarding the long-term destruction of marine ecosystems, and focus on the smaller question of managing fisheries to maximize the economic benefits derived therein. I'll quote from Evolutionary Changes Could Aid Fisheries (Science Daily, July 18, 2013).
Sustainable
fishing practices could lead to larger fishing yields in the long run,
according to a new study that models in detail how ecology and evolution
affect the economics of fishing.
Evolutionary changes induced by fisheries may benefit the fishers, according to a new study published last week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
But if fisheries are not well-managed, this potential benefit turns
into economic losses, as stocks decline from overfishing and further
suffer from evolution.
The bad news is that today very few fisheries are managed in a way
that will lead to yield increases in the long term. While these
fisheries may not be in danger of collapsing, IIASA Evolution and
Ecology Program Leader Ulf Dieckmann says, "There is a big difference
between preventing stocks from collapsing and managing them so as to
achieve an optimal harvest."
The new study, led by 2005 IIASA YSSP participant and Peccei Award
winner Anna Maria Eikeset, examines Northeast Arctic cod [image above], one of the
most commercially important fisheries in the world.
It builds on a
growing body of work showing that fisheries-induced evolution typically
leads to faster growth and earlier maturation.
These evolutionary changes may harm a fishery, since they tend to
lead to smaller adult fish and could push the animals to reproduce at
too early an age, when they are not yet good at it.
On the other hand,
the changes can also lead to greater reproduction and hence more fish.
But nobody knew how these negative and positive effects balance out
economically.
The new study shows that the balance depends on how aggressively a
stock is fished: if the fish are harvested optimally, evolution helps,
whereas if the fish are harvested too aggressively, evolution harms the
economic interests of fishers and fishing nations.
Consequently, to reap these long-term benefits, fisheries managers
must first cut back substantially on the amount of fish that are
harvested today.
"Harvesting Northeast Arctic cod optimally means taking 50% less
fish," says Dieckmann. "Our model shows that by making this substantial
cut and waiting for the stock to rebuild, evolution and natural growth
could lead to sustainable yields over 30% greater than today."
The reason "very few fisheries" are managed in a way that increases long-term economic benefits is that nearly all fisheries are exploited to maximize short-term economic benefits, and the long-term health of the fishery be damned. There are only a few exceptions where regulation of fisheries is imposed from above by governments which can impose legal action and penalties. Otherwise, humans always take a myopic, devil-may-care view of ocean resources.
Do you think that fishermen, whether they are private citizens or corporations, would change their fishing practices if only Norwegian scientist Anna Maria Eikeset got a chance to sit down and talk to them about the consequences of overfishing?
I don't think so.
Is there anything rational about how humans exploit the world's ocean fisheries? Anything at all?
When we "push the rationality hypothesis as far as it will go," to quote Ben Bernanke, we see that it doesn't go very far, not just in these case studies but in thousands of others that could be brought to bear. Floyd Norris has something interesting to say about this.
It seems to me that [Bernanke] had both Minsky and Kindleberger wrong.
Their
insight was that behavior that seems perfectly rational at the time can
turn out to be destructive.
As Robert J. Barbera, now the co-director of
the Center for Financial Economics at Johns Hopkins University, wrote
in his 2009 book, “The Cost of Capitalism,” “One of Minsky’s great
insights was his anticipation of the ‘Paradox of Goldilocks.’
Because
rising conviction about a benign future, in turn, evokes rising
commitment to risk, the system becomes increasingly vulnerable to
retrenchment, notwithstanding the fact that consensus expectations
remain reasonable relative to recent history.”
Behavior that seems "perfectly rational" in the short term turns out to be
destructive over the longer term. These destructive outcomes decisively
undermine the imputation of rationality in our economic life.
And there
is nothing rational about "rising conviction about a benign future." I
call that innate Optimism. What are the risks of creating generations of
student debt slaves? What are the longer term risks of overfishing the
oceans? What are the risks of letting the financial system run wild for
decades?
The Realist says the risks are great. The Optimist, echoing Alfred E. Neuman, says "risks? what risks?"
That's the final word on "rationality" in our economic life.