Signs that the Empire is in decline are everywhere you look, but you won't find anybody on Wall Street or Washington who will acknowledge it. Nor will you find such admissions among people with a vested interest in the status quo. If you visit the offices of the New York Times, don't expect to find many people who are willing to say the United States is going down the tubes.
But Matt Taibbi doesn't work for the New York Times, where he would definitely not be welcome. He works for Rolling Stone, an outcast in a cultural ghetto where he can be ignored by the Powers That Be. His latest question is Why Isn't Wall Street In Jail? That's an excellent question. On Wall Street, nobody goes to jail. Not a single Master of the Universe has been put in prison, yet that would be highly effective in deterring fraud.
To understand the significance of this, one has to think carefully about the efficacy of fines as a punishment for a defendant pool that includes the richest people on earth — people who simply get their companies to pay their fines for them. Conversely, one has to consider the powerful deterrent to further wrongdoing that the state is missing by not introducing this particular class of people to the experience of incarceration. "You put Lloyd Blankfein in pound-me-in-the-ass prison for one six-month term, and all this bullshit would stop, all over Wall Street," says a former congressional aide. "That's all it would take. Just once."
But that hasn't happened. Because the entire system set up to monitor and regulate Wall Street is fucked up.
How fucked up is it? Taibbi asked Lynn Turner.
The systematic lack of regulation has left even the country's top regulators frustrated. Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant for the SEC, laughs darkly at the idea that the criminal justice system is broken when it comes to Wall Street. "I think you've got a wrong assumption — that we even have a law-enforcement agency when it comes to Wall Street," he says.
In short, the regulators and the regulated have formed a cozy club. They all know each other on a first-name basis, and there is a revolving door—one week you're a regulator, but next month you might be one of the regulated, or vice versa. Taibbi tells a typical story to illustrate how non-regulation works.
The pattern of inaction toward shady deals on Wall Street grew worse and worse after Lynn Turner left, with one slam-dunk case after another either languishing for years or disappearing altogether. Perhaps the most notorious example involved Gary Aguirre, an SEC investigator who was literally fired after he questioned the agency's failure to pursue an insider-trading case against John Mack [left], now the chairman of Morgan Stanley and one of America's most powerful bankers.
Aguirre joined the SEC in September 2004. Two days into his career as a financial investigator, he was asked to look into an insider-trading complaint against a hedge-fund megastar named Art Samberg. One day, with no advance research or discussion, Samberg had suddenly started buying up huge quantities of shares in a firm called Heller Financial. "It was as if Art Samberg woke up one morning and a voice from the heavens told him to start buying Heller," Aguirre recalls. "And he wasn't just buying shares — there were some days when he was trying to buy three times as many shares as were being traded that day." A few weeks later, Heller was bought by General Electric — and Samberg pocketed $18 million.
After some digging, Aguirre found himself focusing on one suspect as the likely source who had tipped Samberg off: John Mack, a close friend of Samberg's who had just stepped down as president of Morgan Stanley. At the time, Mack had been on Samberg's case to cut him into a deal involving a spinoff of the tech company Lucent — an investment that stood to make Mack a lot of money. "Mack is busting my chops" to give him a piece of the action, Samberg told an employee in an e-mail.
A week later, Mack flew to Switzerland to interview for a top job at Credit Suisse First Boston. Among the investment bank's clients, as it happened, was a firm called Heller Financial. We don't know for sure what Mack learned on his Swiss trip; years later, Mack would claim that he had thrown away his notes about the meetings. But we do know that as soon as Mack returned from the trip, on a Friday, he called up his buddy Samberg. The very next morning, Mack was cut into the Lucent deal — a favor that netted him more than $10 million. And as soon as the market reopened after the weekend, Samberg started buying every Heller share in sight, right before it was snapped up by GE — a suspiciously timed move that earned him the equivalent of Derek Jeter's annual salary for just a few minutes of work.
The deal looked like a classic case of insider trading. But in the summer of 2005, when Aguirre told his boss he planned to interview Mack, things started getting weird. His boss told him the case wasn't likely to fly, explaining that Mack had "powerful political connections." (The investment banker had been a fundraising "Ranger" for George Bush in 2004, and would go on to be a key backer of Hillary Clinton in 2008.)
Aguirre also started to feel pressure from Morgan Stanley, which was in the process of trying to rehire Mack as CEO. At first, Aguirre was contacted by the bank's regulatory liaison, Eric Dinallo, a former top aide to Eliot Spitzer. But it didn't take long for Morgan Stanley to work its way up the SEC chain of command. Within three days, another of the firm's lawyers, Mary Jo White, was on the phone with the SEC's director of enforcement. In a shocking move that was later singled out by Senate investigators, the director actually appeared to reassure White, dismissing the case against Mack as "smoke" rather than "fire." White, incidentally, was herself the former U.S. attorney of the Southern District of New York — one of the top cops on Wall Street.
Pause for a minute to take this in. Aguirre, an SEC foot soldier, is trying to interview a major Wall Street executive — not handcuff the guy or impound his yacht, mind you, just talk to him. In the course of doing so, he finds out that his target's firm is being represented not only by Eliot Spitzer's former top aide, but by the former U.S. attorney overseeing Wall Street, who is going four levels over his head to speak directly to the chief of the SEC's enforcement division — not Aguirre's boss, but his boss's boss's boss's boss. Mack himself, meanwhile, was being represented by Gary Lynch, a former SEC director of enforcement.
Aguirre didn't stand a chance. A month after he complained to his supervisors that he was being blocked from interviewing Mack, he was summarily fired, without notice. The case against Mack was immediately dropped: all depositions canceled, no further subpoenas issued. "It all happened so fast, I needed a seat belt," recalls Aguirre, who had just received a stellar performance review from his bosses. The SEC eventually paid Aguirre a settlement of $755,000 for wrongful dismissal.
Rather than going after Mack, the SEC started looking for someone else to blame for tipping off Samberg. (It was, Aguirre quips, "O.J.'s search for the real killers.") It wasn't until a year later that the agency finally got around to interviewing Mack, who denied any wrongdoing. The four-hour deposition took place on August 1st, 2006 — just days after the five-year statute of limitations on insider trading had expired in the case.
It's damn near impossible to make this kind of stuff up. What did Senate investigators conclude about the case?
"At best, the picture shows extraordinarily lax enforcement by the SEC," Senate investigators would later conclude. "At worse, the picture is colored with overtones of a possible cover-up."
Covered with overtones of a possible cover up? That seems to understate the problem, don't you think? 
I was going to write that we have two criminal justice systems in the United States, one for Them and one for Us. But that's all wrong! There is only one criminal justice system in the United States—one for Us.
I urge you to read Taibbi's long article, which is rich in juicy details. But let us stand back for a moment and think about this. Even without the damning details, the mere fact that nobody on Wall Street has gone to jail tells us that the fix is in. I often write about corruption on this blog, but my focus has always been on the Congress and campaign contributions.
Taibbi has done us an enormous service by exposing the corruption among regulators like those in Securities And Exchange Commission (SEC). Think about the implications of this. For example, the corrupt Congress passed a financial "reform" bill recently. This bill passed a large part of the burden for making the rules governing the banks onto the regulators. But the regulators are corrupt, too! The whole situation is utterly hopeless. It can't be fixed. There is no one left for us to turn to.
Corruption has always existed in this country and all other countries, but it is a matter of degree. As the Empire declines, the simple rule "I'll scratch your back and you scratch mine" becomes the normal way of operating, not just an occasional problem. The line between the Good Guys and the Bad Guys is not just blurred, it has disappeared altogether. The revolving door becomes the rule, not the exception.
Don't hold your breath waiting for the New York Times to get the message.
Bonus Video — Watch Amy Goodman's interview with Matt Taibbi. Remember as you watch it that there's nothing to be done about any of this.